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Abstract
This paper aims to answer the following question: what is (are) the cause(s) of 
the severe reduction in bank credits in Japan between 1999 and 2005? The answer to 
this question becomes very interesting if we know that during the above mentioned 
period an uuullltttrrraaa–expansionary monetary policy has been implemented by the Bank of 
Japan. A theoretical lending–supply model is built. The methodological contribution of 
this work stands on the test of three credit crunch–hypotheses, all together. The 
estimation results show that during the period of study a credit crunch was, indeed, 
taking place and it is attributed to bankers’ ppprrreeecccaaauuutttiiiooonnnaaarrryyy behavior rather than direct 
regulatory capital worries. The strengthening of the regulatory environment started in 
1998 can explain the conservative lending behavior of Japanese banks during the period 
of study.
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21. Introduction
The observation of the Japanese bank lending data since the beginning of the 
1990s shows that until the last years of this decade the lending growth rate was 
alternating between positive and negative figures (Chart 1). However, since 1998, this 
alternation has changed and the year-to-year changes in bank credits have become 
persistently negative for almost five years. The registered figures during these five years 
were even lower than what has been registered in 1997; a year of a severe credit supply 
contraction (i.e., a cccrrreeedddiiittt      cccrrruuunnnccchhh) according to many researches.
Thus, the question that one can ask is: What is (are) the cause(s) of this severe 
reduction in the availability of bank credits in Japan during the period (1999–2005)? 
The answer to this question becomes highly interesting if we know that during the 
abovementioned period an uuullltttrrraaa–expansionary monetary policy has been implemented 
by the Bank of Japan; namely the ZZZeeerrrooo–––IIInnnttteeerrreeesssttt       RRRaaattteee       PPPooollliiicccyyy (the ZIRP) and the 
QQQuuuaaannntttiiitttaaatttiiivvveee      EEEaaasssiiinnnggg      PPPooollliiicccyyy (the QEP).
The low availability of bank credits can, evidently, be attributed to whether a 
weak lending enthusiasm on the part of banks (i.e., sssuuupppppplllyyy       sssiiidddeee       fffaaaccctttooorrrsss) or a lower 
market demand for loans (i.e., dddeeemmmaaannnddd      sssiiidddeee      fffaaaccctttooorrrsss). Note that if the reduction in credits 
is attributed to supply–side factors, such a phenomenon is called by economists a cccrrreeedddiiittt      
cccrrruuunnnccchhh. This paper aims to find some answers to the abovementioned question. 
Numerous economists have been interested on bank lending behavior and the 
credit crunch phenomenon, especially after the adoption by many developed countries 
of the capital regulation framework of the BBBaaassseeelll       AAAccccccooorrrdddsss in 1988. Several research 
works have proven that this new framework, the regulatory capital ratio (i.e., the BIS 
ratio) in particular, was responsible for the credit crunches occurred in many developed 
countries such as the U.S. in the early 1990s and Japan in 1997.
In this paper we build a theoretical lending–supply model that will constitute the 
theoretical base on which stand the lending–supply regression that will be estimated 
afterwards.
With regard to the Japanese literature the methodological contribution of this 
work stands on the test of three credit crunch–hypotheses, all together, instead of just 
one hypothesis; that is the iiimmmpppaaacccttt      ooofff      ttthhheee      cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      aaadddeeeqqquuuaaacccyyy      rrraaatttiiiooo      hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss.
Working on a panel data of Japanese banks throughout the period  between 1999 
and 2005, the estimation results show that during the abovementioned period a credit 
3crunch was taking place and this credit crunch is attributed to bankers’ ppprrreeecccaaauuutttiiiooonnnaaarrryyy
and rrriiissskkk–––aaavvveeerrrsssiiivvveee behavior rather than direct regulatory capital worries as it was proven 
in 1997 by some research works. Indeed, bankers’ worries about the risk of bankruptcy 
in conjunction with managers’ concerns about their personal ssspppeeeccciiifffiiiccc       hhhuuummmaaannn       cccaaapppiiitttaaalll
have, obviously, weakened the enthusiasm and the willingness of the Japanese financial 
intermediaries to grant new loans. Several factors can explain such a prudent and a 
precautionary lending policy on the part of banks during the period of study; namely: 1) 
the strengthening of the regulatory environment after the adoption in 1998 of the ppprrrooommmpppttt      
cccooorrrrrreeeccctttiiivvveee       aaaccctttiiiooonnn       (the PCA) and the subsequent reinforcement of the legal pursuit 
measures that aim to clarify the liability of the executives of failed financial institutions, 
2) the expected toughening in fund raising after the lift of the full coverage of all types 
of deposits projected to be in 2001, 1 3) the abatement of the moral hazard problem in 
the system after allowing some financial institutions previously considered as tttoooooo-­-­-bbbiiiggg-­-­-
tttooo-­-­-fffaaaiiilll to bankrupt2 and 4) the persistent shrink in asset prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
lending activity of Japanese banks during the period (1999–2005). Section 3 presents a 
literature review. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework. Section g provides the 
model specification. Section 6 describes the data and section 7 shows the results. And 
finally we conclude.
2. Overview of the Japanese Banking System
Since the fiscal year (henceforth, FY) 1999 through almost the third quarter of 
the FY2005 the lending volume has continued its declining tendency that started in the 
second half of the 1990s, but at a faster pace. The volume of loans was decreasing on 
average at approximately 4 percent every year3 compared to an average of +0.3 percent 
each year between FY1992 and FY1998. In total, commercial banks’ lending4 has 
decreased by almost 20 percent5 during the period between 1999 and 2005 against a 
total increase of two percent between FY1992 and FY 1998.
The decline in credits was more severe for the major banks than the regional 
                                                 
1 Later this date was postponed by one year.
2 The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed on November 1997…etc.
3 (-5) percent until FY 2003
4 It is intended  by commercial banks: city banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks and 
regional banks and regional banks II.
5 Statistics on the Deposits and Loans Market of the BoJ, 2008
4banks. As shown by chart 1, major bank lending has, annually, decreased by more than 
6 percent during a large part of FYs 2003 and 2004.
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Note that the period (FY1999–FY2005) was characterized by two uuullltttrrraaa-
expansionary monetary policies namely ttthhheee      ZZZeeerrrooo      IIInnnttteeerrreeesssttt      RRRaaattteee      PPPooollliiicccyyy (the ZIRP) and ttthhheee      
QQQuuuaaannntttiiitttaaatttiiivvveee      EEEaaasssiiinnnggg      PPPooollliiicccyyy (the QEP).6
As shown in chart 1, the annual growth rates of bank loans during the ZIRP–
QEP period were the lowest since 1992 and even more negative than what had been 
realized in FY 1997; which was empirically proven to be a cccrrreeedddiiittt       cccrrruuunnnccchhh777 year by a 
broad literature (Woo, 2003 and Watanabe, 2007).
Outwardly, there are many signs of the occurrence of a cccrrreeedddiiittt      cccrrruuunnnccchhh,,, during the 
period from FY1999 through FY2005, that motivate the investigation of this 
phenomenon in more depth. It is important to note that the balance sheet assets 
reallocation from loans to securities, as shown by charts 1 and 2, is considered in the 
literature as the hhhaaallllllmmmaaarrrkkk of a cccrrreeedddiiittt       cccrrruuunnnccchhh phenomenon (Wagster, 1999). Baba eeettt      aaalll
(2005) conclude that during the ZIRP–QEP period many factors including the 
uuunnnwwwiiilllllliiinnngggnnneeessssss on the part of banks to extend new loans, due to capital limitations, have 
prevented firms with lower credit standings from eeennnjjjoooyyyiiinnnggg      ttthhheee      eeeaaasssiiinnnggg      eeeffffffeeecccttt      ooofff      mmmooonnneeetttaaarrryyy      
                                                 
6 The expressions “the period (FY1999 – FY2005)” and “the ZIRP – QEP period” will be used 
interchangeably in this dissertation.
7 To be defined later.
5pppooollliiicccyyy...8
Chart 2
year- to-year change in investments in securities by banks
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In short, this research aims to answer the following questions:
WWWhhhaaattt       aaarrreee       ttthhheee       cccaaauuussseeesss       bbbeeehhhiiinnnddd       ttthhheee      ooobbbssseeerrrvvveeeddd       rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn       iiinnn       ttthhheee      aaavvvaaaiiilllaaabbbiiillliiitttyyy       ooofff       bbbaaannnkkk      
llloooaaannnsss      ddduuurrriiinnnggg      ttthhheee      pppeeerrriiioooddd      (((FFFYYY111999999999–––FFFYYY222000000555)))???      AAArrreee      ttthhheeessseee      cccaaauuussseeesss      iiinnnhhheeerrreeennnttt      tttooo      ttthhheee      sssuuuppppppllliiieeerrrsss’’’      
iiinnnttteeerrrnnnaaalll      cccooonnndddiiitttiiiooonnnsss      ooorrr      tttooo      ttthhheee      mmmaaarrrkkkeeettt      cccooonnndddiiitttiiiooonnnsss???
3. Literature Review
Since the commencement of the implementation of the capital measurement 
system – commonly referred to as the BBBaaasssllleee      CCCaaapppiiitttaaalll      AAAccccccooorrrddd – by developed countries in 
the early 1990s, many economists have been interested in the impact of the RRRiiissskkk-­-­-BBBaaassseeeddd      
CCCaaapppiiitttaaalll       RRReeeqqquuuiiirrreeemmmeeennnttt (RBC) and other types of regulatory capital standards on the 
banking behavior, particularly the lending activity. The underlying hypothesis tested is 
whether the pressure to meet the capital adequacy requirements could constrain banks 
from granting new loans as issuing new equity involves costs associated to the
asymmetric information between investors and banks. The binding capital requirement 
applied on banks could cause a cccrrreeedddiiittt       cccrrruuunnnccchhh and therefore harm seriously the real 
economy.
Bernanke et al. (1991) work constitutes a cornerstone paper in the crrreeedddiiittt      cccrrruuunnnccchhh
empirical literature. In their paper, they defined the cccrrreeedddiiittt       cccrrruuunnnccchhh phenomenon as “AAA      
sssiiigggnnniiifffiiicccaaannnttt       llleeeffftttwwwaaarrrddd      ssshhhiiifffttt       iiinnn      ttthhheee      sssuuupppppplllyyy      cccuuurrrvvveee      fffooorrr      bbbaaannnkkk      llloooaaannnsss,,,      hhhooollldddiiinnnggg      cccooonnnssstttaaannnttt      bbbooottthhh      ttthhheee      
                                                 
8 The other factors developed by the authors are: the difficulty to issue bonds and the distressed 
asset markets.
6sssaaafffeee      rrreeeaaalll      iiinnnttteeerrreeesssttt      rrraaattteee      aaannnddd      ttthhheee      qqquuuaaallliiitttyyy      ooofff      pppooottteeennntttiiiaaalll      bbbooorrrrrrooowwweeerrrsss”””. 
In their empirical investigation on the causes of the credit slowdown 
experienced by the U.S. banking system in the early 1990s recession, Bernanke et al. 
find arguments in favor of a cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      cccrrruuunnnccchhh occurrence.9 They argue that the bbbeeegggiiinnnnnniiinnnggg-­-­-
ooofff-­-­-pppeeerrriiioooddd capital ratio was more stringent on the lending activity of small banks than the 
lending activity of large banks. 
Peek and Rosengren (1995a), focusing on New England, argue that the formal 
regulatory actions, such as capital requirements, have played a key role in the cccrrreeedddiiittt      
cccrrruuunnnccchhh of the early 1990s. In another paper, Peek and Rosengren (1995b) provide 
evidence that capital-constrained and unconstrained banks react dddiiiffffffeeerrreeennntttlllyyy to the 
changes in the federal funds rate. A major implication of their findings is that the 
financial situation of the banking sector should be taken into account by the monetary 
policymakers. In a third paper, Peek and Rosengren (1995c) adopt an interesting 
approach that consist in focusing on deposits (llliiiaaabbbiiillliiitttiiieeesss) rather than loans (aaasssssseeetttsss) to 
test the cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      cccrrruuunnnccchhh hypothesis. This new approach aimed to limit the effect of the 
loan demand shocks. The authors find evidence of a cccaaapppiiitttaaalll       cccrrruuunnnccchhh by obtaining a 
strong positive relationship between a bank’s capital shock and the growth rate of its 
deposits. Peek and Rosengren insist on the need of a greater appreciation by the 
regulators of the macroeconomic impact of the bank regulatory policy.
Conversely, Berger and Udell (1994) found that the RRRiiissskkk-­-­-BBBaaassseeeddd       CCCaaapppiiitttaaalll ratio 
(henceforth, the RBC)10 does not explain mmmuuuccchhh of the credit reallocation away from 
lending between 1990 (first quarter) and 1992 (second quarter). According to these 
authors the reduction in loan demand is primarily responsible for the observed fall in 
bank credits in the U.S. during the mentioned period. The one important methodological 
contribution, which differentiates their research work relatively to other papers, consists 
in including a cccooonnntttrrrooolll       pppeeerrriiioooddd in order to determine definitive conclusions about the 
existence a cccrrreeedddiiittt      cccrrruuunnnccchhh.11
With regard to Japan many studies have been conducted also in order to test the 
implications of the BBBaaasssllleee      AAAccccccooorrrdddsss on the credit activity. Honda (2002) and Montgomery 
(2005) have proved empirically the binding effects of these accords on bank credits. Ito 
                                                 
9 Expression first used by Richard Syron who was a member of the Federal Reserve Board’s 
monetary policy committee 1989-1994. In short capital crunch means a fall in bank capital.
10 The Basel ratio and the risk-based capital ratio are used interchangeably.
11 They define the credit crunch as a reduction in the credit supply relative to the normal supply.
7and Sasaki (1998) argue that the risk–based capital requirement was a serious hurdle 
only for iiinnnttteeerrrnnnaaatttiiiooonnnaaallllllyyy active banks, i.e., city banks.
Peek and Rosengren (1997) argue that capital constraints brought on by the 
decline in the Japanese stock market were associated with the decrease in credits made 
by Japanese banks’ branches in the U.S. market. Using the cross-section data of March 
1993,12 Ueda (1993) analyzes the effects of the bad loans, the latent capital gains, and 
the RBC ratio on bank lending in Japan and shows that the RBC did affect negatively 
the lending growth rate of city banks. Yoshikawa et al (1994) examine the same data 
and found that it was a dddeeemmmaaannnddd decline rather than a sssuuupppppplllyyy shift that explains the 
plunge in granted credits. Honda et al (1995) attempt to measure the impact of the 
capital requirement ratio and the non-performing loans on the lending and show that 
these financial conditions affect ooonnnlllyyy major banks’ lending behavior.
Woo (2003), using the market–based capital ratio instead of the publicly 
available regulatory capital adequacy ratios, finds no evidence supporting the cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      
cccrrruuunnnccchhh      hypothesis in the early years of the 1990s. Conversely, he finds that weak banks 
tended to increase their lending more rapidly than well-capitalized banks revealing, 
accordingly, the laxity of the regulatory policy in Japan during that time. Nevertheless, 
his paper gives strong evidence in favor of the occurrence of a cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      cccrrruuunnnccchhh in 1997. 
Watanabe (2007) confirms this result and proves that the 1998’s public funds injections 
into constrained banks did not offset the negative lending supply shock of the previous 
year. However, the author suggests that these public funds injections may have 
prevented the declining aggregate demand from getting worse.
4. Model
On the basis of a micro–foundation analysis of a representative banking firm, we 
build an intertemporal lending model that will constitute the theoretical backbone of a 
regression to be estimated afterwards. It is worth to mention that, according to Rochet 
(2008), in today’s banking activity one–period models necessarily miss important 
consequences of bank solvency regulations. Some of the credit crunch literature adopts 
an intertemporal approach.13,14
This micro–foundation analysis reposes on the maximization of a regulatory–
                                                 
12 21 city bank, long-term credit and trust banks and 129 regional banks.
13 Bernanke et al. (1991), Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) and Montgomery and Shimizutani, (2007).
14 From an econometric point of view, dynamic models have the advantage of keeping away the 
problem of simultaneity that we can face with static models.
8constrained profit function of a representative bank i. The first order condition–derived 
equation is then used to determine the loan–supply function. The same approach has 
been followed in Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000), Montgomery (2004) Montgomery and 
Shimizutani (2007).
In short, the theoretical approach consists in the maximization of ttthhheee       ppprrrooofffiiittt      
fffuuunnnccctttiiiooonnn      of a bank i, under the subsequent two constraints:
1) TTThhheee      bbbaaalllaaannnccceee      ssshhheeeeeettt      iiidddeeennntttiiitttyyy...
2) TTThhheee      ppprrruuudddeeennntttiiiaaalll      rrreeeggguuulllaaatttiiiooonnn      cccooonnnssstttrrraaaiiinnnttt...
4.1 Theoretical Framework
Consider a representative banking firm i that has the following balance sheet 
structure:
Assets Capital and Liabilities
 LLLoooaaannnsss      (((LLL)))
 SSSeeecccuuurrriiitttiiieeesss      (((SSS)))
 CCCaaapppiiitttaaalll      (((KKK)))
 PPPooosssiiitttiiiooonnn      iiinnn      MMMooonnneeeyyy      MMMaaarrrkkkeeettt      (((MMM)))
 DDDeeepppooosssiiitttsss      (((DDD)))
Thus, we have at time t the following balance sheet identity,
Lt + St = Kt + Dt + Mt      t = 0…. f     (1)
The bank i is assumed to be risk–neutral and pursue a profit maximization 
objective in a pppeeerrrfffeeeccctttlllyyy       cccooommmpppeeetttiiitttiiivvveee credit market. Therefore, the interest rate, rrrLLL, is 
considered as given. Moreover, the interest rates on the securities, rrrSSS, the deposits, rrrDDD, 
and the money market, rrrCCC, are also assumed to be given.15
If the bank i is constrained by the prudential regulation, the following capital 
constraint a la Kashyap and Stein (1994) applies:
tttttt KKKLLL dP                      (2)
Where: P is the minimum regulatory-imposed level of the capital–to–assets 
ratio.
According to the balance sheet structure, the representative bank i’s revenue is 
composed by interest incomes on loans and securities:
rrrLLLttt            LLLttt                                                                                                                                                                        (3)
rrrSSSttt SSSttt                                                           (4)
In the other hand, the bank i is subject to the following costs:
                                                 
15 The last argument is not illogical since interest rates on the money market are fixed by the 
Central Bank.
9a) Interests paid on deposits:  ttt
DDD
ttt DDDrrr                                                  (5)
b) Interests paid on the position on the money market:  ttt
CCC
ttt MMMrrr         (6)
c) Cost of default on loans: tttttt LLLT                                                        (7)
The theta, tttT , is the percentage of defaults on loans that depends on some 
macroeconomic factors to be spelled out shortly below.16
d) Adjustment costs:17 It is assumed that the bank i’s adjustments costs have the 
following –quadratic–function
 21120 22  ttttttttt LLLLLL
hhhLLLhhh                                       (8)
Where: h0 > 0 and h1 > 018
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The profit of the representative bank i is the discounted sum of the future net 
cash flows. Hence, after taking into account equations (1) to (8), the profit function S
becomes as follows:
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Where:
i = 0…f
EEEttt[[[...]]]:::      mmmaaattthhheeemmmaaatttiiicccaaalll      eeexxxpppeeeccctttaaatttiiiooonnn      ooopppeeerrraaatttooorrr      cccooonnndddiiitttiiiooonnnaaalll      ooonnn      ttthhheee      iiinnnfffooorrrmmmaaatttiiiooonnn      
aaavvvaaaiiilllaaabbbllleee      iiinnn      pppeeerrriiioooddd      ttt...
bbb      iiisss      ttthhheee      dddiiissscccooouuunnnttt      fffaaaccctttooorrr      aaassssssuuummmeeeddd      tttooo      bbbeee      eeeqqquuuaaalll      ooonnneee      wwwhhheeennn      iii      ===      000
Replacing M by its expression, Mt = Lt + St – Kt – Dt, the profit function (9) is 
then read:
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16 With a purpose of simplification it is assumed that bank i’s customers default on loans and not 
on interests’ income. Therefore, T applies only on the stock of loans and not on the underlying amount of 
interests.
17 In addition to interest cost there are several costs associated with banking activities. Blackwell 
and Santomero (1982), Lane (1985) and Stanhouse (1983) argue that if banks want to issue loans to the 
general public, then the banks must devote resources to the evaluation of the credit rating of the customer, 
as well, as the administration and monitoring of the loan during its duration. If there is a change in the 
amount of the loans issued by the banks, then the banks need to adjust the amount of the resources 
allocated to loan activities.
18 The smoothness of the stock of loans trend and the plausible estimation results, as we will see 
later, dismiss the potentiality of a very-near-to-zero value for h0 and h1.
10
Thus, the maximization of the bank i’s profit function S under the prudential 
regulation constraint (2) can, mathematically, be stated as follows:
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The maximization of the profit function (10) subject to the prudential regulation 
constraint (2), yields the following Euler equation:
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 ttttttCCCtttLLLtttttttttttt bbbhhhbbbhhhrrrrrrbbbhhhLLLbbbLLLbbbhhh
bbbhhhhhhLLLEEE OPT
111
1
1
10
1
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Where, Ot, is the LLLaaagggrrraaannngggeee multiplier associated with the prudential regulation 
constraint.
5. Empirical Model
5. 1 Credit Crunch Hypotheses
The theoretical model defined in the previous section will represent the 
backbone of the lending–supply function that will be estimated later in this paper. 
However, in order to explore thoroughly the type of a potential credit crunch that might 
have been taking place during the ZIRP–QEP period, some other credit crunch 
hypotheses should be tested in conjunction with the prudential regulation hypothesis.19
Consequently, some other hypotheses–representative variables should be taken into 
account by the model defined earlier. Wagster (1999) says that the empirical literature 
regarding the U.S.–credit crunch has examined several supply–side hypotheses in 
addition to the iiimmmpppaaacccttt       ooofff       ttthhheee       cccaaapppiiitttaaalll       aaadddeeeqqquuuaaacccyyy       rrraaatttiiiooo       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss20 (Syron, 1991; 
Bernanke et al, 1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995a), principally21:
- TTThhheee       vvvooollluuunnntttaaarrryyy       rrriiissskkk-­-­-rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss, also called ttthhheee       rrriiissskkk       aaavvveeerrrsssiiiooonnn      
hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss (Bacon and Wessel, 1991; Hancock and Wilcox, 1992).
- TTThhheee       iiinnnttteeennnsssiiivvveee       rrreeeggguuulllaaatttooorrryyy       ssscccrrruuutttiiinnnyyy       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss (Owens and Schreft, 1993; 
Greenspan, 1992; LaWare, 1991).
ccc-­-­-111-­-­- TTThhheee       vvvooollluuunnntttaaarrryyy       rrriiissskkk-­-­-rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss       ooorrr       ttthhheee       rrriiissskkk-­-­-aaavvveeerrrsssiiiooonnn       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss:::      
                                                 
19 Also called the iiimmmpppaaacccttt      ooofff      ttthhheee      cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      aaadddeeeqqquuuaaacccyyy      rrraaatttiiiooo      hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss, represented by the prudential 
constraint in equation (2)
20 Also called ttthhheee      iiimmmpppaaacccttt      ooofff      llloooaaannn      lllooosssssseeesss      ooonnn      bbbaaannnkkk      eeeqqquuuiiitttyyy      cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss.
21 The credit crunch literature includes also another hypothesis called ttthhheee      iiinnntttrrroooddduuuccctttiiiooonnn      ooofff      nnneeewww      
cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      rrreeeggguuulllaaatttiiiooonnnsss      hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss (Baer and McElravey, 1994). Through the test of this hypothesis, 
economists wanted to investigate the impact of the BBBaaasssllleee      AAAccccccooorrrdddsss on the behavior of banks.
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Shrieves and Dahl (1992 and 1995) point out that the bank’s ppprrriiivvvaaattteee      iiinnnccceeennntttiiivvveeesss to reduce 
risks (i.e., loans) are consistent with ttthhheee      bbbaaannnkkkrrruuuppptttcccyyy      cccooosssttt      aaavvvoooiiidddaaannnccceee and ttthhheee      mmmaaannnaaagggeeerrriiiaaalll      
rrriiissskkk      aaavvveeerrrsssiiiooonnn theories of capital structure and risk taking behavior (Orgler and Taggart, 
1983 and Saunders et al 1990). According to these theories, banks may have an 
incentive to reduce their portfolio risk in order to reduce the ppprrrooobbbaaabbbiiillliiitttyyy      ooofff      bbbaaannnkkkrrruuuppptttcccyyy
and therefore avoid the expected bankruptcy costs.22 Managers, as well, may have an 
incentive to reduce the risk of bbbaaannnkkk      iiinnnsssooolllvvveeennncccyyy      below the level desired by stockholders 
since managers, who are assumed to be compensated with risky fixed claims on the 
bank and who, have firm and industry ssspppeeeccciiifffiiiccc      hhhuuummmaaannn      cccaaapppiiitttaaalll, have a great deal to lose 
personally in the event of the risk of bbbaaannnkkk       iiinnnsssooolllvvveeennncccyyy. The managerial risk aversion 
theory finds bases also in Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) who state that in order to avoid 
iiinnnttteeerrrfffeeerrreeennnccceee from debtholders (or their representative23), managers would be more 
disciplined.
According to Shrieves and Dahl (1995), bankers’ cccooonnnssseeerrrvvvaaatttiiisssmmm can, practically, 
increase as a result of some regulatory changes –such as imposing heavy fines on 
managers– and/or perhaps as a result of the changing economic climate.
Obviously, during the period between 1999 and 2005 there are many signs of an 
increased conservatism among Japanese banks. Firstly, as shown by the chart 3, there is 
no uniformity in the decreasing pace among the credit categories.24 Secondly, as shown 
by the charts 1, 2 and 4, the period of study is characterized by an asset reallocation 
from loans to securities in cccooonnnjjjuuunnnccctttiiiooonnn with an increase (or unchanged) risk–based 
capital ratio. Thirdly, some regulatory reforms carried out just before and during the 
ZIRP–QEP period might have diminished the wwwiiilllllliiinnngggnnneeessssss of banks to lend in ways 
which extended beyond the targeted loan-specific limitations. Indeed, the banking 
supervisory body won more independence from the political influence and the legal 
pursuit measures related to the clarification of the liability of the executives of failed 
financial institutions were strengthened.
                                                 
22 The value of expected bbbaaannnkkkrrruuuppptttcccyyy      cccooossstttsss is an increasing function of ttthhheee      ppprrrooobbbaaabbbiiillliiitttyyy      ooofff      
bbbaaannnkkkrrruuuppptttcccyyy...
23 The debtholders representative is indeed the regulator of banks.
24 Note that when calculating the BIS or the Tier1 ratios, the weight applied to private sector’s 
loans is 100%
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ccc-­-­-222-­-­- TTThhheee      iiinnnttteeennnsssiiivvveee      rrreeeggguuulllaaatttooorrryyy      ssscccrrruuutttiiinnnyyy      hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss::: 222555
There are many evidences that motivate the investigation of the potential impact 
of the regulatory scrutiny on banks lending decisions in Japan. As a matter of fact, some 
dramatic changes in bank regulations have been implemented by the Japanese 
government since the late of the 1990s. These risk-control measures refer, principally, 
to: 1) the ratification of the Bank of Japan law that established its independence and 
explicitly confirmed the right to examine its counterparty financial institutions, 2) the 
reform of the banking law by establishing the PPPrrrooommmpppttt      CCCooorrrrrreeeccctttiiivvveee      AAAccctttiiiooonnn (henceforth ttthhheee      
                                                 
25 In Bernanke et al. (1991)’s terms this factor is called “““ooovvveeerrrzzzeeeaaalllooouuusss      rrreeeggguuulllaaatttiiiooonnn...”””
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PPPCCCAAA) procedure and the Financial Supervisory Agency (the FSA).26 The FSA was 
established with the purpose to oversee the rehabilitation of the financial sector and 
improve supervision, 3) enhancement of the disclosure standards on banks’ assets 
quality, 4) the obligation to disclose banks’ financial information on a consolidated 
basis. It is important to mention that, since the beginning of the 2000s, the FSA has 
conducted two rounds of special inspection leading to more realistic loans quality 
assessment.
Moreover, and following the same reasoning as LaWare (1991), it is worth 
noting that after the costly failures of financial institutions in the second mid of the 
1990s, there might be a nnnaaatttuuurrraaalll tendency from Japanese examiners to become more 
pppeeessssssiiimmmiiissstttiiiccc and ssskkkeeeppptttiiicccaaalll in their evaluation of loans.
5.2 Model
555...222...111      AAAssssssuuummmppptttiiiooonnnsss
With the purpose to estimate the model in equation (11), several additional 
assumptions have yet to be taken:
a – The cost of default on loans, T, depends on some macroeconomic factors...
According to the dddeeebbbttt-­-­-dddeeeffflllaaatttiiiooonnn       ttthhheeeooorrryyy as extended by Tobin (1980), the eeerrrooosssiiiooonnn of 
collaterals because of deflation forces banks to restrict credits to borrowers. In this 
sense, Keynes (1932) argued that “““………ttthhheee      dddeeecccllliiinnneee       iiinnn      ppprrriiiccceeesss      ddduuurrriiinnnggg      ttthhheee      gggrrreeeaaattt      dddeeeppprrreeessssssiiiooonnn      
eeerrrooodddeeeddd      ttthhheee      vvvaaallluuueee      ooofff      ttthhheee      mmmaaarrrgggiiinnn      ttthhhaaattt      ppprrrooovvviiidddeeeddd      ttthhheee      ssseeecccuuurrriiitttyyy      oooffffffeeerrreeeddd      bbbyyy      ttthhheee      bbbooorrrrrrooowwweeerrrsss      tttooo      ttthhheee      
llleeennndddeeerrr………...””” This development has threatened the solvency of U.S. banks at that time 
(Wolfson, 1996). Hence, we can say that the cost of default, T, depends on the 
collaterals’ prices evolvement. Indeed, as the collaterals’ prices increase, the security 
provided to lenders is consequently enhanced, and therefore the cost of default on loans, 
T, decreases (and vice–versa). 
The cost of default on loans depends also on the evolvement of the economic 
climate as well. In fact, a recessionary business cycle exerts pressures on the corporate 
sector cash flows and harms, consequently, its creditworthiness and its ability to 
reimburse its debts and arrears. As a result, the costs related to the default on loans 
jumps during recessions.
According to the above analysis, the percentage of defaults on loans, T, can be 
                                                 
26 The old name of the current Financial Service Agency.
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formulated as a function of the changes in collateral prices and business conditions. 
Since Japanese banks rely massively on lllaaannndddsss      aaannnddd      rrreeeaaalll      eeessstttaaattteeesss      as collaterals27 the lllaaannnddd      
ppprrriiiccceee      gggrrrooowwwttthhh      rrraaattteee will be employed as a representative variable for the collateral price 
changes. To reflect changes in business conditions the GGGDDDPPP      growth rate is employed.
For the sake of simplification, it is assumed that T is a linear function on land 
price and GDP growth rates:
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b – The LLLaaagggrrraaannngggeee multiplier, O, in the equation (11) per se is not observable and 
therefore must, for empirical purposes, be substituted by an observable proxy. The 
unobservable variable, O, is interpreted as the marginal increase of the bank i’s objective 
function – i.e., the profit function – when the inequality constraint, KKKLLL dP , is relaxed 
by one unit. The degree to which the inequality constraint is severe might be measured 
by how distant the observed capital adequacy ratio is from the required level (either 8% 
or 4%). It can be argued, hence, that as the risk–based capital ratio goes downturn, as 
the LLLaaagggrrraaannngggeee multiplier Ot increases. Consequently, this argument justifies the inclusion 
of the observable BIS ratio as a proxy of the unobservable (–Ot) in the equation (11).
c – Although, the iiimmmpppaaacccttt       ooofff       ttthhheee       cccaaapppiiitttaaalll       aaadddeeeqqquuuaaacccyyy       rrraaatttiiiooo       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss is usually 
represented in the literature by whether the BIS ratio or the Tier1 ratio, there are some 
limits and no consensus among researchers concerning the effective representative 
variables that can reflect the second and the third hypotheses (Shrieves and Dahl, 1995). 
Indeed, In order to represent the vvvooollluuunnntttaaarrryyy rrriiissskkk-­-­-rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss in the equation 
(11), we should hire a variable that embodies the bankers’ perceived eeexxxpppeeecccttteeeddd risk of 
insolvency.28 We follow Berger and Udell (1994) and employ the uuunnnwwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd bbbooooookkk–––
bbbaaassseeeddd       cccaaapppiiitttaaalll       rrraaatttiiiooo (ttthhheee       BBBBBBCCCRRR) as a representative variable for ttthhheee       vvvooollluuunnntttaaarrryyy       rrriiissskkk-­-­-
rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss.29 The underlying logic lies firstly on the bbbaaannnkkkrrruuuppptttcccyyy       cccooosssttt      
                                                 
27 Shimizu (2000)
28 Bankers could be managers and/or owners of the banking firm.
29 It is worthy to note that Shrieves and Dahl (1995) argue that finding an indicator that 
adequately captures changes in expectations regarding loan risk is not an incontestable task. In fact, the 
percentage of non-performing loans, used in some of the literature, measures the quality of the loans 
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aaavvvoooiiidddaaannnccceee and ttthhheee       mmmaaannnaaagggeeerrriiiaaalll       rrriiissskkk       aaavvveeerrrsssiiiooonnn theories. Secondly, ttthhheee       vvvooollluuunnntttaaarrryyy       rrriiissskkk      
rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn      hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss would be more identified with the uuunnnwwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd book–based capital 
ratio (the BBCR) which is a pppuuurrreeerrr measure of the –eeexxxpppeeecccttteeeddd– risk and less related to the 
rrreeeggguuulllaaatttiiiooonnn than the wwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd capital–to–asset ratios and the percentage of the non–
performing loans.
With regard to ttthhheee       iiinnnttteeennnsssiiivvveee       rrreeeggguuulllaaatttooorrryyy       ssscccrrruuutttiiinnnyyy       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss, we employ the 
percentage of non–performing loans (the NPL) as a representative variable in the 
lending supply function (11). In fact, it is highly expected that as the percentage of 
delinquent loans increases in the balance sheet as the intensity of scrutiny applied by the 
regulator on the banking firm increases.30
Burger and Udell (1994) recommend that it is necessary that all risk variables, 
(i.e., the BIS, the BBCR, the NPL), be included in the loan–supply functions together 
since they are expected to have a high degree of intercorrelation; if some of the risk 
variables were excluded, then, their effect may be falsely incorporated in the measured 
effects of the included risk variables, possibly, yielding improper support for one 
hypothesis when the other is true. This point represents a methodological advantage of 
this research with regard to previous works in the Japanese credit crunch literature.
Finally, an important theoretical device is further used. Indeed, it is assumed 
that, on the basis of the information available in period t, the bank i forms its 
expectations rrraaatttiiiooonnnaaallllllyyy.31 Therefore, the expected future lending level, E[Lt+1], can be 
substituted by the actual lending value, Lt+1, and a forecast error term, [t+1; consequently 
we have: E[Lt+1] = Lt+1 + [t+1.
444...222...222      RRReeegggrrreeessssssiiiooonnn
After considering the abovementioned assumptions, the estimable equation of 
the dynamic model (11) becomes as follows:
                                                                                                                                                 
which have already been made and hence does not necessarily reveal risk expectations. Moreover, if 
changes in risk perception or risk aversion are a manifestation of some changes in the regulatory climate, 
it is difficult to distinguish their effects from the more direct impact of changes in regulatory minimum 
capital requirements which is a separate focus in the analysis.
30 The regulatory reforms of the late 1990s and the subsequent rounds of portfolio examination 
carried out by the FSA represent some evidence in favor of the increase in the scrutiny of the regulator (as 
opposed to the laxity of the first half of the 1990s proved by Woo (2003)) and the high quality of the 
NPLs as an indicator of the scrutiny. Berger and Udell (1994) employ the same variable.
31 This theoretical device was employed in Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000).
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Where: 
BBBBBBCCCRRR:::      ttthhheee      uuunnnwwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd      bbbooooookkk-­-­-bbbaaassseeeddd      cccaaapppiiitttaaalll      rrraaatttiiiooo
NNNPPPLLL:::      ttthhheee      pppeeerrrccceeennntttaaagggeee      ooofff      ttthhheee      nnnooonnn-­-­-pppeeerrrfffooorrrmmmiiinnnggg      llloooaaannnsss      iiinnn      tttoootttaaalll      llloooaaannnsss
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All the other variables in the equation (12) are already defined earlier.
Needless to say that in addition to the supply–side explanation, represented by 
the capital ratios (the RBC and the BBCR) and the percentage of non–performing loans 
(the NPL), the land price and the GDP variables represent the demand-side explanation 
of the lending behavior. As noted earlier, the conjunction of falling prices of real estates 
(and other assets) and recessionary pressures on corporate cash flows affect adversely 
potential borrowers’ net worth. Bernanke et al.(1991) argue that for a given set of 
investment opportunities, borrowers who are less creditworthy will have lower effective 
demand for external finance at given values of the safe real interest rate.33 As shown by 
the chart 5, some support for the demand–side explanation comes from the fact that 
nonbank credit extensions also diminished substantially during the ZIRP–QEP period.
                                                 
32 It should be noted that the forecast error iiittt[ is uncorrelated with any variables contained in the 
bank’s information set in period t under the rational expectation assumption. This property is very useful 
in solving the problem of simultaneity between lending level and capital adequacy ratios (the BIS and the 
Tier1 ratios).
33 We should acknowledge, however, that the land price (LP) and GDP growth rates can be 
viewed as economic outlook indicators and considered, hence, by banks as indexes for the establishment 
of their future lending sssuuupppppplllyyy plans. This fact shows the difficulty of separating the decrease in demand 
that normally occurs in a recession from the diminished supply of loans. This difficulty was, according to 
Peek and Rosengren (1995 c), hampering the empirical investigation of credit crunches.
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6. Data Set Description
The sample chosen comprises all commercial banks continuously active between 
FY 1999 and FY 2005. Since the cccrrreeedddiiittt      cccrrruuunnnccchhh represents a change in bank behavior, 
banks affected by banking failure, liquidated or nationalized as well as banks having 
experienced rescue mergers or acquisitions are dropped from the sample because their 
end-of-period balance sheet is zero. Their inclusion would bias the results towards 
finding a relationship between capital and credits shrinkage that represent insolvency 
rather than changes in bank behavior.34 The banking firms that changed their status from 
iiinnnttteeerrrnnnaaatttiiiooonnnaaallllllyyy active bank to dddooommmeeessstttiiicccaaallllllyyy active bank (or the reverse), through the 
period of study, are dropped from the sample as well.
Merged banks are treated as one entity for the entire sample period.35 As a result, 
the retained sample includes 108 banks (2 city banks, 103 regional banks and 3 trust 
banks) representing about 73 percent of the total banking assets in FY 2005.
Data sources are the Japanese Bankers Association Reports (Zenginkyo), the 
Bankscope Database (Bureau Van Dijk), the stock exchange markets reports, the 
Financial Statements of Japanese Banks and the Bank of Japan statistics.
                                                 
34 Sampling method used by Peek and Rosengren (c 1995) and Watanabe (2007)
35 Method employed by Peek and Rosengren in many of their paper researches.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Major Banks
N Mean Median
Stand. 
dev
Min Max
Total Assets (billion yen) 35 60,193.1 25,612.4 54,722.8 11,888.8 162,395.5
Total adjusted outstanding 
amount of lending (billion yen)
35
32,300.6 11.881.8 29,267.2 7,219.2 84,384.8
Total amount of bad loans 
(billion yen)
35
1,961.8 960.1 2,171.1 77.474 9,060.4
BIS ratio % 35 11.26 11.36 1.32 6.71 14.6
Regional Banks
N Mean Median
Stand. 
dev
Min Max
Total Assets (billion yen) 721 2,282 1,785.8 1,946.7 243.8 10,655.2
Total adjusted outstanding 
amount of lending (billion yen)
721
1,522.2 1,206.4 1,307.2 181.8 8,141.6
Total amount of bad loans 
(billion yen)
721
101 78.3 87.6 8 556.5
BIS ratio % 721 9.2 9.21 1.64 0.45 13.9
7. Results
Tables 2, provides the estimation results of the dynamic lending–supply model 
(12) for all viable banks during the sample period between FY1999 and FY2005. In all 
specifications, two risk-based capital ratios are used, namely the BIS ratio and the Tier1 
ratio.36
The estimation method employed is the general method of moments technique 
(the GMM) originally developed by Hansen (1982). The list of instruments used in the 
estimation include the twice and thrice lagged lending growth rates, 'ln(L), the lagged 
interest rate differential, (rL – rC), the lagged wwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd risk – based capital ratio, the BIS 
ratio or the Tier1 ratio, the lagged uuunnnwwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd book – based capital ratio, the BBCR, the 
lagged percentage of non-performing loans, the NPL, the lagged land price growth rate, 
'ln(LP), and the lagged GDP growth rate, the 'ln(GDP). Before going into the depth of 
the analysis, note that in both regressions the tests of overidentification restrictions –
i.e., the J-statistic – do not reject the null hypothesis at the one percent level.37 This 
result reveals that the dynamic specification is not misspecified and the choice of the 
                                                 
36 The software used for the econometric estimation is EVIEWS 6.
37 H0: All overidentification restrictions are valid.
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instruments is satisfactory.
Regardless of the type of the wwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd capital ratio employed, the estimation 
results in both regressions agree to each other. The uuunnnwwweeeiiiggghhhttteeeddd BBCR coefficient 
estimates have the expected positive sign and are highly statistically significant in both 
regressions. This finding shows that, during the period of study, less–capitalized banks 
were more reluctant to grant new loans than well–capitalized ones.
Moreover, the regulatory weighted capital ratios and the NPL coefficient 
estimates have the right theoretical signs but are not significantly different from zero. 
The coefficient estimates of the monetary policy variable, namely the interest rate 
differential, (rL – rC), have the theoretically predicted negative signs but are not 
significantly different from zero. This result shows clearly that the expansionary 
monetary policy implemented during the period of study was ineffective. 
In general, these findings reveal that eeexxxpppeeecccttteeeddd-­-­-rrriiissskkk      wwwooorrrrrriiieeesss rather than rrreeeggguuulllaaatttooorrryyy      
cccooonnnccceeerrrnnnsss were responsible for the reluctance of a broad number of Japanese banks to 
make loans.
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Table 2- Dynamic Model 
Dependent variable:
Ljt
GMM GMM
Lit-1
0.366655 ***
(7.093634)
0.372340***
(7.119320)
Lit-2
0.081733 ***
(3.006829)
0.079438***
(2.873483)
(rL  -  rC)t-1 -20.25376(-0.682863)
-17.49987
(-0.605501)
BISit-1
4.675904
(1.144461)
Tier1it-1
2.055220
(0.523092)
BBCRit-1
11.26264 **
(2.168533)
12.62782**
(2.278001)
NPL_shareit-1 -0.523926 (-0.278845)
-1.318374
(-0.655646)
('LP/LP)t-1 17.04311***(3.257073)
16.81678***
(3.280330)
('GDP/GDP)jt-1 0.516997 (0.612987)
0.429589
(0.489378)
J-statistic
(p-value)
8.340113
(68.2%)
9.264896
(59.7%)
Number of Obs. 756 756
On the subject of the loan demand-side variables, both coefficient estimates are, 
in accordance with the theory, positive but only the lagged land price growth rate’s 
coefficients are highly statistically significant. However, this result appears to confirm 
ppprrriiivvvaaattteee       iiinnnccceeennntttiiivvveeesss–––dddrrriiivvveeennn      cccrrreeedddiiittt      cccrrruuunnnccchhh rather than a demand-side explanation. In fact, 
as it was pointed out by Shrieves and Dahl (1995), banker cccooonnnssseeerrrvvvaaatttiiisssmmm can rise as a 
result of an instable economic climate. The continuous shrink in the land prices (table 3) 
seems to confirm bankers’ ppprrreeecccaaauuutttiiiooonnnaaarrryyy       llleeennndddiiinnnggg       pppooollliiicccyyy that the economic recovery, 
observed since the FY 2003 (table 3), was not sufficient to alleviate. These findings, 
hence, are in favor of ttthhheee       vvvooollluuunnntttaaarrryyy       rrriiissskkk-­-­-rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn       hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss rather than any other 
hypothesis.
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Table 3- Selected Economic Indicators in Japan between FYs 1999 and 2006
Real GDP 
growth rate
Unemploym
ent rate
CPI GDP 
deflator
Land Price
(2000=100)
1999 0.7 4.7 -0.3 -1.4 106.1
2000 2.2 4.7 -0.8 -1.9 100
2001 -0.5 5.0 -0.7 -1.5 93.7
2002 0.1 5.4 -0.9 -1.6 87.4
2003 1.8 5.4 -0.3 -1.6 81.2
2004 2.3 4.7 0.0 -1.2 74.4
2005 2.6 4.4 -0.3 -1.3 69.1
2006 2.0 4.1 0.0 n.a. 65.7
Source: IMF and Japan Real Estate Institute
The empirical demonstration of the credit crunch and its risk–aversion (or 
voluntary) nature – as opposed to the regulatory-driven credit crunch of the late 1990s –
confirms the arguments advanced earlier in favor of the investigation of ttthhheee      vvvooollluuunnntttaaarrryyy      
rrriiissskkk–––rrreeeddduuuccctttiiiooonnn      (((ooorrr      rrriiissskkk–––aaavvveeerrrsssiiiooonnn)))      hhhyyypppooottthhheeesssiiisss. The ppprrreeecccaaauuutttiiiooonnnaaarrryyy      llleeennndddiiinnnggg      pppooollliiicccyyy followed 
by the Japanese banks during the ZIRP–QEP period is most likely attributed to the 
regulatory changes and the economic and the banking environment that characterized 
Japan since the late 1990s particularly. Obviously, the adoption of the PPPrrrooommmpppttt      
CCCooorrrrrreeeccctttiiivvveee       AAAccctttiiiooonnn procedures (((ttthhheee       PPPCCCAAA))) in the late 1990s seems, in the light of the 
theory of Dewatripont and Tirole (1993)38, to have dddiiisssccciiipppllliiinnneeeddd banks’ decision makers. 
Indeed, since the PCA is concise “ooobbbjjjeeeccctttiiivvveee” information–based procedures of public 
interventions in case of poor performance, bank managers appear to have started being 
more cautious than before about the bbbaaannnkkkrrruuuppptttcccyyy       rrriiissskkk of their institutions and that in 
order to avoid the iiinnnttteeerrrfffeeerrreeennnccceee      of the regulator.39 This behavior becomes more urgent 
when the economy is characterized by an instable growth and a non-stop shrink in 
collateral prices as it was the case during the ZIRP–QEP period. Thus, the PCA 
framework appears, clearly, to have disciplined Japanese bankers by weakening their 
rrreeeggguuulllaaatttooorrryyy       fffooorrrbbbeeeaaarrraaannnccceee       aaannntttiiiccciiipppaaatttiiiooonnnsss. It is most likely that since the late 1990s40
Japanese bankers have raised their tttaaarrrgggeeettt capital ratios (or oooppptttiiimmmaaalll capital ratios) with 
the perspective to have a sufficient capital bbbuuuffffffeeerrr that can absorb any potential shocks 
that might hit their financial institutions and cause their failure accordingly.
Note that further and not less important regulatory events have most likely 
increased the ssseeennnsssiiitttiiivvviiitttyyy of Japanese bankers towards risk. The first event is the 
                                                 
38 This theory defines the principle of eeexxxttteeerrrnnnaaalll iiinnnttteeerrrfffeeerrreeennnccceee      rrriiiggghhhtttsss in the internal management of 
the bank by the debtholders’ representative when it is not performing well.
39 i.e. the debtholders representative
40 The beginning of the period of study.
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strengthening, since 1998, of the legal pursuit measures that aim to clarify the liability 
of the executives of failed financial institutions. The second event is the 
implementation, since 2002, of the Takenaka’s41 banking reinforcement policy whose 
objective was to resolve the longtime annoying problem of bad assets focusing 
especially on those held by major banks.42Moreover, from the perspective of the late 
1990s, Japanese bankers likely wanted to reduce their bbbaaannnkkkrrruuuppptttcccyyy       rrriiissskkk      so as to lower 
their eeexxxpppeeecccttteeeddd cost of uninsured funding after the intended lift of the bbblllaaannnkkkeeettt       dddeeepppooosssiiittt
ggguuuaaarrraaannnttteeeeee of all types of deposits expected to be in FY 200143 and its substitution by a 
pppaaarrrtttiiiaaalll coverage of the time deposits. Imai (2006), Murata and Hori (2006) and Inakura 
and Shimizutani (2008) have demonstrated, indeed, a significant increase in the deposit 
market discipline since 2002.
On the other hand, the series of bank failures that have occurred in Japan during 
the second mid of the 1990s might have served as a lesson for the “surviving” banking 
sector and, consequently, increased its risk–averseness and ssseeelllfff–––dddiiisssccciiipppllliiinnneee...444444 It is worthy 
to note that the failure of an important and big bank such the HHHoookkkkkkaaaiiidddooo      TTTaaakkkuuussshhhoookkkuuu      BBBaaannnkkk      
on November 1997 has, according to Woo (2003), weakened the moral hazard in the 
system and particularly the “““tttoooooo-­-­-bbbiiiggg-­-­-tttooo-­-­-fffaaaiiilll”””      sentiment.
8. Conclusion
Obviously, the empirical results attribute the severe and continuous decline in 
bank credits during the period between 1999 and 2005 to, principally, some supply–side 
factors confirming therefore our suspicion about the occurrence of a credit crunch. The 
test of three possible causes, all together, has revealed that this credit crunch is driven 
by bankruptcy–risk worries rather than direct regulatory capital worries as it was the 
case in 1997, according to a large consensus in the literature.
The regulatory reforms implemented by the authorities since the late 1990s and 
the deposit insurance design policy appear to have played an important role in 
                                                 
41 Heizo Takenaka a former Keio University professor was also the Minister of State for 
Economic and Fiscal Policy, replaced in October 2002, Hakuo Yanagisawa in the post of minister in 
charge of the FSA.
42 Takenaka’s policy is implemented through two programs: “The Program for 
Financial Revival”and “The Action Program Concerning Enhancement of Relationship 
Banking Functions”
43 Later, this plan was postponed by one year and the blanket deposit guarantee was lifted in FY 
2002.
44 Saunders et al (1990) argue that risk-averse behavior may limit bank risk-taking.
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increasing the awareness of the Japanese bankers toward their eeexxxpppeeecccttteeeddd risk and in 
forcing them, accordingly, to pursue a more prudent lending policy throughout the 
period between 1999 and 2005. In fact, the adoption of the PCA’s structured procedures 
of intervention in 1998 has, obviously, limited the fffooorrrbbbeeeaaarrraaannnccceee mmmaaarrrgggiiinnn that the banking 
supervisor used to have with distressed banks and reinforced therefore the ssseeelllfff-­-­-
dddiiisssccciiipppllliiinnneee. Bankers have become more conscious about their bankruptcy risk especially 
in an environment characterized by a persistent fall in assets’ prices.
It is worthy to note that the period (FY1999–FY2005) can be considered as an 
essential and an ineluctable adaptation period for the Japanese bankers to the highly 
significant regulatory reforms that were introduced by the government since the second 
half of the 1990s. Indeed, Japanese banks have had to follow a very prudent lending 
policy in order to adjust themselves to a new regulatory and banking environment. This 
adjustment has taken more than five years and the positive lending growth rates, 
registered since FY 2006, are signs of the return of the confidence to the banking sector.
This cccooonnnssseeerrrvvvaaatttiiivvveee lending policy has, most likely, weakened and delayed the 
effectiveness of the uuullltttrrraaa–monetary policies conducted by the bank of Japan during the 
period (FY1999–FY2005); namely ttthhheee       zzzeeerrrooo       iiinnnttteeerrreeesssttt       rrraaattteee       pppooollliiicccyyy (the ZIRP) and ttthhheee      
QQQuuuaaannntttiiitttaaatttiiivvveee      EEEaaasssiiinnnggg      PPPooollliiicccyyy (the QEP). This argument finds support in Baba eeettt      aaalll (2005) 
who concluded that during the ZIRP–QEP period many factors including the 
uuunnnwwwiiilllllliiinnngggnnneeessssss on the part of banks to extend new loans, due to capital limitations, have 
prevented firms with lower credit standings from “““………eeennnjjjoooyyyiiinnnggg       ttthhheee       eeeaaasssiiinnnggg       eeeffffffeeecccttt       ooofff      
mmmooonnneeetttaaarrryyy       pppooollliiicccyyy444555...”””       However, the regulatory reforms, which were to great extent 
responsible for this “““pppooottteeennntttiiiaaalll””” ineffectiveness in the short and the medium run, are 
essential for a sound banking sector and, accordingly, a much more effective monetary 
policy in the long run.
It is worthy to note that the direct impact of banks’ cccooonnnssseeerrrvvvaaatttiiisssmmm on the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy needs further theoretical and empirical 
investigations. This would be a very interesting subject for future research.
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